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Abstract
The ￿nancial markets turmoil of 2007-09 impacted on the overnight segment, which is
the ￿rst step of monetary policy implementation. We model the volatility of the EONIA
spread as an EGARCH. However, the nature of the EGARCH considered will be di⁄erent
in the period before the ￿xed rate full allotment policy of the ECB (2004 - 2008) where
we follow the approach of Hamilton (1996) and in the period afterwards (2008 - 2009)
where a conventional EGARCH seems su¢ cient to capture the behaviour of volatility. The
results suggest a greater di¢ culty during the turmoil for the ECB to steer the level of the
EONIA spread relative to the main reference rate. The liquidity e⁄ect has been reduced
since 2007 and in particular since the full allotment policy at the re￿nancing operations.
On the other hand, the liquidity policy and especially the provision of long-term liquidity
followed was e⁄ective in reducing market volatility. Liquidity provision conditions were
also found to have in￿ uenced the EONIA spread only since the ￿nancial market turmoil.
Fine-tuning operations contributed to stabilize money market conditions, especially during
the turmoil. The EGARCH parameter estimates also suggest a structural change in the
behaviour of the EONIA spread in reaction to shocks.
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11 Introduction
Nowadays, monetary policy is implemented in developed economies by setting a reference level
for a short-term interest rate. The ECB Governing Council is responsible for setting the o¢ cial
interest rates in the euro area, which serve as a benchmark for interbank market interest
rates. This corresponds to the ￿rst step of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The
expectations theory, one of the explaining theories of the yield curve argues that an investment
with a longer maturity should generate the same return as a shorter term investment plus a
forward investment for the remaining maturity. This implies that the long-term interest rate
should re￿ ect the current level of the shorter-term interest rate and its expectations over the
maturity of the long-term investment. Thus, ultimately, it is the shortest maturity interest rate,
i.e., the overnight interest rate, and the expectations on this rate that determine the remaining
interest rates. It is therefore important to understand how the Eurosystem in￿ uences the
market interest rate, i.e., the benchmark overnight interest rate for the euro area, the Euro
Overnight Index Average rate (EONIA).
The ￿nancial turmoil that began in 2007 had a signi￿cant impact on the functioning of
the money market. Interest rates in this market increased substantially and volatility soared.
Longer-term money market interest rates began to incorporate larger liquidity and credit risk
premia. The overnight segment turned more volatile and contingent to conditions of interbank
market functioning. This situation may have altered the Eurosystem￿ s ability to intervene in
the interbank market and steer interest rates in line with monetary policy stance.
Our aim in this paper is to analyse the EONIA spread against the main ECB reference
rate. Under ￿normal￿ market functioning conditions, the EONIA should ￿ uctuate around
the main ECB reference rate. Given that most empirical studies focus on the period prior
to the new operational framework, it is relevant to reassess the EONIA spread determinants
under ￿normal￿conditions and the eventual changes under market stress situations, both in
the money market and in ￿nancial markets in general. This paper is organized as follows: in
section 2 we recall the main features of the euro area money market and the monetary policy
implementation framework of the Eurosystem. In section 3, we describe the recent evolution
of the EONIA, focusing mainly on the ￿nancial turmoil that began in 2007 and on the most
relevant events to explain the behaviour in the money market. In section 4, we explain the
methodology and the data used and section 5 presents the main estimation results. Section 6
concludes.
2 The euro area money market and the implementation
of monetary policy
According to the ECB (2004), "monetary policy exerts signi￿cant in￿uence over short-term
nominal market interest rates. By setting interest rates, monetary policy in￿uences the econ-
omy, and ultimately the price level, in a number of ways." The monetary policy transmission
mechanism begins then with the setting of o¢ cial interest rates. The European Central Bank
(ECB) provides funding or receives deposits from market participants at these rates, which
then serve as benchmark to interbank market interest rates. Longer maturity money market
rates, such as the 3- and 6-month Euribor, which are widely used as an index for interest rates
on bank loans in several euro area countries, are in￿ uenced by expectations over shorter term
interest rates, and by liquidity and credit risk premium. Therefore, changes in o¢ cial interest
rates impact banks funding costs and bank loans interest rates. Since the central bank reference
rates are transmitted along the yield curve and other asset prices, the central bank is able to
in￿ uence investment and consumption decisions and, ultimately, consumer prices.
2The Eurosystem in￿ uences short-term interest rates since it sets the price of the monetary
base, of which the Eurosystem is the sole supplier.1 The Eurosystem has at its disposal several
means of intervention in the market for reserves. The main re￿nancing operation (MRO) is
the most important open market instrument. In these operations, which are conducted every
week, the Eurosystem provides liquidity with one-week maturity, according to its forecast for
the aggregate liquidity needs of the euro area banking system. Between 2000 and 2008, banks
interested in obtaining funding through the MRO would have to submit bids in the pair bid
amount-interest rate. The bids are satis￿ed by decreasing order of bid rates, which cannot
be below the minimum bid rate de￿ned by the ECB. Since October 2008, following worldwide
￿nancial markets stress, notably in short-term funding markets, the Eurosystem adopted a ￿xed
rate full allotment (FRFA) tender procedure. This meant that counterparties began bidding
only the amount of primary liquidity they would need, obtaining the full amount and paying
the interest rate de￿ned by the ECB equal for all participants.2
The Eurosystem also provides reserves at a longer term via its longer-term re￿nancing
operations (LTRO). These operations are conducted monthly and have a 3-month maturity.
With these operations the Eurosystem does not aim at steering longer maturities interest rates
but only to provide liquidity for a longer period of time in order to smooth the banking system￿ s
funding needs. Therefore, LTRO are conducted as pure variable rate tender, i.e., there is no
limit on the interest rates that banks can propose. During the ￿nancial turmoil, some changes
were introduced in this instrument: the Eurosystem conducted operations with 6- and 12-
month maturity, increased the frequency of 3-month operations and, similarly to the MRO,
since October 2008, adopted the ￿xed rate full allotment tender procedure.
Another available type of open market operation is the ￿ne-tuning operation (FTO). Con-
trary to the MRO and LTRO, these are not regular nor pre-scheduled operations. They aim at
managing the liquidity situation and steering interest rates in the money market, in particular
to smooth the e⁄ects on interest rates from unexpected liquidity ￿ uctuations. The majority
of the FTO conducted so far had overnight maturity and same day value. Since March 2004,
several changes were introduced in the operational framework3 (ECB, 2003) and although the
frequency of FTO increased these operations did not become a regular feature. In the new oper-
ational framework, the last MRO is allotted one week before the end of the maintenance period,
which means that during the last week liquidity imbalances (liquidity forecast errors) accumu-
late.4 When these imbalances reach a signi￿cant value, they originate pressure on short-term
market interest rates, and consequently, the frequency of FTO￿ s increases.5
The Eurosystem also has at the disposition of counterparties two standing facilities, the
deposit and the marginal lending facilities. The rates of these facilities are set at a "penalty"
level, in order to induce institutions to use this instrument only in case of late, large and
unexpected individual liquidity shocks. The facilities have overnight maturity and therefore
aim at limiting the volatility of overnight rates. Counterparties have no incentive to trade
above the marginal lending facility rate or below the deposit facility rate, as there is no limit on
1There are several reasons for banks to demand monetary base, such as the public demand for currency, the
need to clear interbank balances and the obligation to meet minimum reserve requirements with the central
bank.
2At the beginning of phase III of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), MRO were also conducted as
a ￿xed rate tender, but the ECB de￿ned the allotment amount. In June 2000, the procedure was changed to a
variable rate tender.
3The period since these changes were introduced is called the new operational framework (NOF).
4One of the changes introduced with the NOF was to coincide the beginning of the maintenance period with
the MRO allotment day immediatelly following the ECB Governing Council meeting for which the monetary
policy stance discussion is scheduled.
5The operational framework still foresees the existence of structural operations, with the aim of shifting
the structural liquidity position of the Eurosystem. These operations are not relevant for the money market
behaviour at the very short-term and were never used so far.
3the use they can make of the facilities.6 Therefore, and as can be observed from Figure 1, the
standing facilities rates form a ￿ uctuation corridor for the market overnight rate (ECB, 2008).
Figure 1: EONIA and ECB reference interest rates
Eurosystem counterparties must ful￿ll reserve requirements, i.e., hold non-negative cur-
rent accounts with the respective national central bank during the reserve maintenance period
(around one month), in such a way that the daily average current accounts is at least the
amount of the reserve requirements. Reserves are remunerated in order to avoid an implicit
taxation on banks.
The Eurosystem does not have an explicit interest rate target, contrary to some central
banks, such as the Federal Reserve Bank or the Bank of England; see Federal Reserve System
(2005) and Bank of England (2008). Its aim is to steer market interest rates at very short
maturities. Nonetheless, the design of the monetary policy operational framework implies that
the overnight market rate usually ￿ uctuates around the middle of the corridor given by the
standing facilities rates. The EONIA rate is the benchmark overnight rate for the euro money
market.7
According to Perez-Quir￿s and MendizÆbal (2006), the main features of the operational
framework that explain EONIA￿ s behaviour are the averaging provision of reserve requirements
and the existence of an interest rates corridor. These features, together with balanced liquidity
supply, lead the EONIA to typically ￿ uctuate around the middle of the corridor. However,
reserve ful￿llments in the di⁄erent days of the maintenance period are not perfect substitutes.
As the end of period approaches, the overnight market rate tends to rise, deviating from the
martingale, as one would expect. Perez-Quir￿s and MendizÆbal￿ s (2006) model replicates this
behaviour using features of the Eurosystem￿ s operational framework without the need to intro-
duce market frictions or non-competitive behaviour.
Empirical studies on the behaviour of the EONIA con￿rm the importance of the mone-
tary policy operational framework. The most important factors driving the spread can be
6With the exception of the collateral that counterparties have to post as a guarantee when they use the
marginal lending facility.
7The EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) is the average of the rates at which major euro area banks
traded during the day weighted by the transactions amount; see http://www.euribor-ebf.eu/euribor-eonia-
org/about-eonia.html for more information.
4related with liquidity conditions, policy rate expectations and calender and end-of-period ef-
fects (Wurtz, 2003, Bindseil et al., 2003, Moschitz, 2004, Nautz and O⁄ermanns, 2006, Linzert
and Schmidt, 2008 and V￿lim￿ki, 2008). Firstly, monetary policy in￿ uences the EONIA by
setting the interest rate level for primary liquidity. For the period before 2004, Nautz and
O⁄ermanns (2006) found a strong link between the EONIA and the policy rate, except at the
end of the maintenance period. Liquidity conditions are closely related to the liquidity provi-
sion by the central bank, which weighs on the level and the volatility of the EONIA (Wurtz,
2003, Moschitz, 2004). Linzert and Schmidt (2008) found that tighter liquidity conditions and
uncertainty regarding liquidity conditions (related with the allotment uncertainty at re￿nanc-
ing operations) pressure the EONIA spread relative to the main ECB reference rate upwards.
The authors conclude that the ECB is only able to reduce the value of the spread when its
liquidity policy induces excess liquidity conditions at the end of the maintenance period. From
a structural point of view, there seems to exist evidence for a positive relation between the
structural liquidity de￿cit, which is partly de￿ned by the ECB, and the value of the EONIA
spread (Linzert and Schmidt, 2008, V￿lim￿ki, 2008).8
The standing facilities interest rate range and the degree of asymmetry relative to the main
reference rate also in￿ uence the market interest rate. A reduction in the amplitude of the
corridor allows the EONIA to be more stable and closer to the policy rate (Perez-Quir￿s and
MendizÆbal, 2006). In a recent paper, Perez-Quir￿s and MendizÆbal (2010) argue that, if banks
have a strong preference for liquidity due to expectations of tight liquidity conditions in the
future, the corridor amplitude only has an impact on the demand for reserves if the corridor is
asymmetric relative to the main reference rate.
Another important feature of the Eurosystem￿ s monetary policy operational framework
is the obligation of counterparties to deliver ￿nancial assets as collateral in the re￿nancing
operations. According to Neyer and Wiemers (2004), the market interest rate becomes higher
than the policy rate when (among other factors, such as, total liquidity needs of the banking
sector and transaction costs in the interbank market) there are opportunity costs of holding
collateral which can di⁄er across banks. Thus, banks with lower opportunity costs of holding
collateral will obtain more funding from the central bank and act as intermediaries for the
remaining banks.
The behaviour of the EONIA also depends on some features of the money market functioning
unrelated to monetary policy. At the end of the month, quarter and year, banks usually
increase their demand for reserves due to expected increases in payment activities occurring
in the last day of the month and due to end of month balance sheet management activities
(Bindseil et al., 2003). Most studies con￿rm the relevance of these calender e⁄ects on the
behaviour of the EONIA (Wurtz, 2003, Moschitz, 2004, among others). In the same token, on
the last day of the reserve maintenance period, counterparties have to fully comply with reserve
requirements, which pressures market transactions. The impact on the EONIA usually depends
on the aggregate liquidity conditions and on the distribution among market participants.
3 Recent evolution of the EONIA spread
The behaviour of the EONIA has changed signi￿cantly since the onset of the ￿nancial crisis
in August 2007 (Figure 1). Figure 2 shows in a clearer way the evolution of the EONIA
spread relative to the MRO minimum bid rate since the implementation of the NOF and
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics (in basis points (b.p.)). As previously mentioned,
8The liquidity de￿cit is given by the total amount of reserve requirements plus the autonomous factors, not
related to monetary policy, such as banknotes in circulation and government deposits. In the Eurosystem, the
liquidity de￿cit is relatively stable, since a large part of it is given by reserve requirements and demand by
banknotes.
5the new operational framework implied signi￿cant changes in the operational framework, and
consequently, the way the overnight market works. Thus, our analysis will only consider the
period from March 2004 onwards. Throughout this paper, the results relative to the NOF
correspond to the period from March 2004 to August 2007. The period of the ￿nancial crisis
starts on August 2007 and the full allotment period begins in October 2008. The sample ends
in December 2009.
Figure 2: Evolution of the EONIA spread since the start of the new operational framework
Full sample NOF Turmoil FRFA
Mean ￿6:53 6:79 0:42 ￿51:03
Median 5:00 7:00 2:95 ￿64:10
Maximum 77:00 77:00 58:80 38:60
Minimum ￿81:40 ￿39:00 ￿55:40 ￿81:40
Std. Dev 26:26 6:72 13:68 21:86
Skewness ￿1:46 1:42 ￿0:71 0:91
Kurtosis 4:09 38:29 6:28 3:13
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the EONIA spread
The EONIA spread was relatively stable from 2004 until the onset of the ￿nancial markets
turmoil in 2007. The average spread was around 7 b.p. with the occurrence of occasional
spikes, which were mostly linked to the reserves maintenance period calender. Since August
2007, the situation changed quite substantially and the spread turned much more volatile. The
behaviour of the EONIA spread within the maintenance period also changed substantially.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show the di⁄erent behaviour of the EONIA spread in
the periods before and during the ￿nancial turmoil. From the amplitude of the spread interval
(maximum - minimum) one can con￿rm the expected increase in the dispersion of the spread
since the beginning of the turmoil. The value for the skewness suggests a larger asymmetry
in the period before the turmoil than during it. The value for the period before the turmoil
6is positive (1.42), implying a positive asymmetry, i.e, a distribution with a longer right tail.
The value for the skewness for the ￿nancial crisis period is close to zero (-0.23), suggesting
a symmetric distribution, but re￿ ecting an opposite situation before and during the FRFA.
The kurtosis of the distribution allows us to conclude in favour of a platykurtic distribution
(a distribution ￿ atter than the normal distribution) for the ￿nancial crisis period, suggesting
a larger frequency of deviations in the EONIA spread. In the period before the turmoil, the
distribution is leptokurtic (taller and more concentrated than the normal), which hints at the
higher stability in the spread during this period.
Figure 3 shows the average and the one standard deviation interval of the EONIA spread for
the same day of the maintenance period. Prior to the crisis, one observed a stable and positive
spread up to the last few days of the maintenance period, during which the spread could vary
substantially. Notice that this pattern is at odds with Perez-Quir￿s and MendizÆbal￿ s (2006)
model predictions of a slightly increase in the overnight interest rate over the maintenance
period, regardless of the liquidity conditions. During the turmoil and before the FRFA, the
spread oscillated around zero with an increased volatility. Following the FRFA policy, the
spread has been on average negative and very volatile all through the maintenance period. We
will now present in more detail the major events occurring during the ￿nancial crisis that may
contribute to explain the evolution of the EONIA spread.
Figure 3: Average EONIA spread over the reserve maintenance period.
Brunnermeier (2009) presents an analysis of the factors which led to the ￿nancial crisis.
In the summer of 2007, investors began a process of strong reassessment of risk related to
revaluations in the market for securitization exposed to the US subprime market. In August,
these fears spread to the euro area banks and money markets. The uncertainty about the
true value and exposure of banks to asset-backed securities, among other assets, lead in a
￿rst phase to a liquidity crisis. While market participants were uncertain about their own
liquidity needs, given the context of higher volatility, they were also revising upwards their
counterparties credit risk in a context of asymmetric information and uncertainty about banks
balance sheets. This translated into an increased demand for liquidity. Banks demand for
7central bank liquidity increased and showed a preference for reserve frontloading, i.e., to hold
more deposits with the central bank than necessary at the beginning of the maintenance period
as a precautionary measure (Figure 4). The bidding behaviour in the Eurosystem re￿nancing
operations also changed and there was an increase in tender bid rates and in its dispersion
(Eisenschmidt et al., 2009). The increase in the demand for liquidity was also visible in the
rise of the amounts that were reported to be traded among EONIA panel banks in the second
half of 2007. There was also a reduction in the availability to trade in the money market at
the remaining maturities. Consequently, interest rates of the unsecured money market segment
jumped, as well as, volatility (ECB, 2009b). Anedoctal and survey evidence (ECB, 2009a)
con￿rms the strong decrease registered in the unsecured money market activity, especially at
longer maturities. Despite the shift in preference from longer to shorter maturities, there seems
to be no relevant impact on interest rates. Zagaglia (2008) reports that before the turmoil,
there was evidence of spillovers of volatility from longer maturities of the money market to
overnight rates, but this no longer occurs during the turmoil.
Figure 4: Average reserve full￿lment path of Eurosystem reserve requirements.
The immediate response of the Eurosystem was to increase the liquidity provision with the
aim of containing excessive deviations of short-term market interest rates from policy rates
(ECB, 2009b). As a consequence, the value of the EONIA spread remained relatively limited
and around zero.
In September 2008, there was a sharp deterioration of the ￿nancial markets following the
Lehman Brothers investment bank fallout, reaching the second phase of the ￿nancial crisis,
the systemic risk phase. Money markets worldwide froze and unsecured market interest rates
skyrocketed. Demand for primary liquidity increased substantially and the use of Eurosystem
standing facilities rose to unprecedented levels. In a situation where credit risk rose substan-
tially, market participants almost ceased to trade between each other and the central bank
took the role of intermediator. The response by central banks was quite signi￿cant. The most
relevant measure taken by the Eurosystem was to switch all liquidity providing tenders to a
procedure of ￿xed rate tender with full allotment of the amount bid by banks. In this way,
8banks were able to secure all their funding needs via the ECB. The ECB also broadened the list
of eligible collateral so that collateral requirements did not became binding. The number and
frequency of re￿nancing operations also increased.9 Aiming at reducing volatility in shorter-
term market interest rates, in October 2008 the ECB narrowed the standing facilities interest
rate corridor from 200 to 100 b.p., keeping it symmetric around the MRO rate.
As a consequence of the measures taken, money market liquidity conditions became rela-
tively ample. Aggregate liquidity was now determined by the demand side and banks were
able to get increased funding at regular operations and depositing it later in the day at the
deposit facility. Thus, money market activity, including the overnight segment, diminished.
The EONIA moved below the MRO rate and kept systematically closer to the deposit facility
rate. Broadly speaking, the measures were e⁄ective in limiting the turmoil in funding markets.
Therefore, in December 2008 the ECB decided to re-widen the interest rate corridor back to
200 b.p. This was expected to reduce ECB intermediation by increasing the banks oppor-
tunity costs of trading in the market. Nonetheless, given that the ￿xed rate full allotment
procedure of re￿nancing operations was kept, the excess liquidity and the high recourse to the
deposit facility remained. The lower level for the deposit facility rate may have contributed to
a further decrease in the EONIA spread, by keeping EONIA closer to the deposit facility rate.
Perez-Quir￿s and MendizÆbal (2010) argue that the symmetry in the corridor, regardless of
the amplitude, does not impact the demand for reserves when banks have a preference for liq-
uidity for precautionary reasons, and therefore, central banks should intervene in the liquidity
provision and the asymmetry degree of the corridor.
One can argue that the central bank has the ability to in￿ uence interest rates when liquidity
risk premium prevails, as seems to have occurred in the ￿rst phase of the crisis (Nobili, 2009
and Frank and Hesse, 2009). However, the ability of central banks to in￿ uence interest rates
when credit risk premium prevails is most likely low. According to Nobili (2009), following the
Lehman Brothers fallout, the liquidity risk premium responded favourably to Eurosystem policy
measures and the credit risk component became then the main responsible for the evolution of
the money market rates. Frank and Hesse (2009) and Christensen et al. (2009) also conclude
in favour of the success of central banks measures on easing stress in unsecured money markets.
In May 2009, money market conditions were more stable. Some additional measures, not di-
rectly related to the situation in the overnight segment, were taken. The Eurosystem expanded
further its non-conventional measures aiming at easing funding conditions in the banking sys-
tem and promoting credit to the rest of the economy (￿enhanced credit support￿phase). The
standing facilities corridor was narrowed again to 150 b.p. in order to avoid the deposit rate
being at the zero lower bound while keeping the corridor symmetric around the MRO rate.
The Eurosystem also decided to purchase covered bonds and to provide further longer-term
liquidity to counterparties via 1-year re￿nancing operations. The ￿rst 1-year operation, con-
ducted at the end of June 2009, met a great demand, implying that about half of the liquidity
provided by regular operations was through the 1-year operation. This operation provided a
substantial liquidity bu⁄er and seems to have allowed for a greater stabilization of the money
market conditions.
4 Data and methodology
In this study the determinants of the EONIA spread are analysed, in particular, the e⁄ects
of the ￿nancial crisis. Only few empirical papers have looked at the behaviour of the EONIA
since the new operational framework. The period analysed in this paper starts in March 2004
9Given that the strains were also felt in the dollar and swiss franc funding markets, the ECB also provided
liquidity to Eurosystem counterparties in these currencies. See, for instance, ECB (2009b) for more details.
9and ends in December 2009.
The liquidity e⁄ect indicates the capacity of the central bank to in￿ uence the level of interest
rates through changes in the supply of reserves. From a monetary policy point of view, it is
important to understand this e⁄ect and how it may have changed with the turbulence of the
￿nancial markets. Given that one of the relevant components for the evolution of the money
market interest rates and, in particular, the EONIA, was the liquidity premium, one may expect
that the ability of the Eurosystem to in￿ uence the interest rates has changed. The Eurosystem
does not completely determine the supply of reserves since it began with the full allotment
procedure at the re￿nancing operations; this may have implied a lower liquidity e⁄ect.
Market turbulence was also a⁄ected by the credit risk component. The e⁄ect on the
overnight segment is not clear. On the one hand, this segment is not subject to credit risk
considerations, and on the other, the larger preference for short-term maturities in detriment
of long-term ones due to credit risk, may imply an indirect e⁄ect on the overnight segment. If
this is the case, it may indicate that monetary policy loses ability to in￿ uence interest rates.
Besides these two e⁄ects, it is also important to analyse other characteristics of the overnight
segment of the money market, such as calendar e⁄ects and e⁄ects of the maintenance period
(Wurtz, 2003, Perez-Quir￿s and MendizÆbal, 2006, Moschitz, 2004, among others).
The methodology used follows previous studies, in particular the seminal work of Hamilton
(1996) for the fed funds rate. The EONIA spread with regards to the MRO rate, which we de￿ne
as st, is modelled considering that the conditional variance follows two regimes. This feature
of the conditional variance is modeled using an exponential general autoregressive conditional
heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model as proposed by Nelson (1991), but with the particularity of
the two regimes introduced by Hamilton (1996). In order to accommodate this characteristic,
the innovations are assumed to follow a distribution which consists of the combination of two
normal distributions which di⁄er in the variance. However, for the FRFA period, we found that
a conventional EGARCH is more appropriate.
Hence, the EONIA spread, st, is described as:
st = ￿t + htvt
where ￿t is the conditional mean, ht the conditional standard deviation and vt are random
shocks which follow a normal distribution with zero mean and variance p+(1￿p)￿2. In other
words, the distribution of the shocks is given as,




















where with probability p, the innovations follow a distribution with low volatility, in which the
variance is normalised to one, and with probability (1 ￿ p), a distribution with high volatility,
whose variance is ￿2. Hamilton (1996) was one of the ￿rst to use this distribution in this context
in order to capture the tails and the infrequent spikes which are found in the fed funds rate.
The equation for the conditional mean of the spread is given as,
￿t = c + ￿st￿1 + ￿
0xt + ￿
0Dt
where c is a constant, st￿1 the ￿rst lag of the spread, xt a vector of explanatory variables and
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10where zt corresponds to a set of explanatory and dummy variables. Considering the logarithm
of the conditional variance ensures that it always assumes positive values, independently of
the sign of the coe¢ cients, avoiding in this way the need to impose restrictions on the model
parameters in order to guarantee that the unconditional variance is positive. The parameter {
allows for the existence of asymmetric e⁄ects, i.e., positive surprises may have di⁄erent impacts
than negative surprises. If { = 0, negative surprises have the same impact on volatility as
positive surprises. If { < 0 ({ > 0), negative (positive) surprises have a larger impact on
volatility. If { < ￿1 ({ > 1), positive (negative) surprises reduce volatility while negative
(positive) ones increase volatility (Hamilton (1994)).
In the mean, as well as, in the variance equation, explanatory variables look to capture
liquidity e⁄ects, credit risk e⁄ects, interest rate expectation e⁄ects (both within the mainte-
nance period as well as in between) and the conditions of primary liquidity provision. The
dummy variables look to capture calendar e⁄ects, end and start of the maintenance period
e⁄ects, ￿ne-tuning operations and changes of o¢ cial interest rates.
5 Results
5.1 The period up to the full allotment policy
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimation results of the model based on a sample from March 2004
to September 2008 when the ECB started the full allotment policy at the liquidity-providing
reverse operations.10 The explanatory variables included in the model are (i) the expected
spread in the maintenance period, measured by the spread between the one week EONIA swap
and the current MRO rate11 and (ii) the liquidity imbalance in relative terms, given by the ratio
between the sum of daily excess reserves accumulated over the maintenance period and the use
of the deposit facility net of the use of the marginal lending facility, and the amount of reserve
requirements. One may expect that the impact of liquidity imbalances is di⁄erent in the last
week of the period, when banks are more sensitive to liquidity variations, in comparison to the
rest of the maintenance period. The dummy variables included are: D1 = 1 for the ￿rst day of
the reserve maintenance period; D2 = 1 for the last day of the month; D3 = 1 for the last day
of the quarter; D4 = 1 for the days in which the ECB Governing Council decided for a change
in o¢ cial interest rates; D5 = 1 for the days in which the ECB conducts a liquidity absorbing
￿ne-tuning operation; D6 = 1 for the days of the last week of the maintenance period; D7 = 1
for the two last days of the month.
From Figure 3 we observe that over the reserve maintenance period the EONIA spread
volatility seems to have changed, while its mean continued relatively stable, slightly positive
and decreasing in the last days of the maintenance period. Two remarks should be taken
into account. The mean spread is lower during the turmoil than before, to which the excess
liquidity created from monetary policy allotments may have contributed. The mean also seems
to be more volatile, but we also have a lower number of maintenance periods (14 compared to
41 before the turmoil). The estimated model takes this dynamics into account, allowing for
di⁄erent behaviour of the variance in the two periods.
In line with what would be expected, we do not ￿nd signi￿cant changes in the mean behav-
iour in the EONIA spread with the start of the ￿nancial turmoil. We observe a slightly positive
10Estimations were done in Gauss 10.0.3 based on an adaptation of the code of Hamilton (1996), available on
his website http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/software.htm#fed.
11The source used for the overnight swaps were the Reuters quotes to June 20, 2005 and the EONIA swap
index of the European Federation of Banks from that date onwards.
11Mean equation
Variable Coe¢ cient St. Error z-stat
C 0:7272 0:1139 6:3844
st￿1 0:7235 0:0262 27:6146
D1: ￿rst day MP 2:1450 0:3479 6:1662
D2: end of month 2:2869 0:2188 10:4497
D3: end of quarter 4:3540 0:1937 22:4785
D4: change in policy rate ￿2:9505 0:7970 ￿3:7020
D5: liq. absorbing FTO 3:8187 0:7197 5:3058
Rel. ex. liq. last week MP ￿147:5670 27:5717 ￿5:3521
Rel. ex. liq. remaining MP ￿25:1357 1:3039 ￿19:2767
Expected spread within MP 0:1965 0:0226 8:7021
Source: Authors￿ calculations.
Table 2: Parameter estimates for the mean equation for the period prior to the full allotment
policy (2-normal mixture distribution)
average spread, in line with theoretical predictions, given the tender procedure followed during
this period. Indeed, the Eurosystem followed a variable rate tender procedure with a minimum
bid rate at the MRO, which imposed the main policy rate as the benchmark for the lowest cost
of primary liquidity. Therefore, under normal market conditions it would be expectable that
market participants would cover this primary cost by trading slightly above the policy rate.
From Figure 3, it seems that there may have been a decrease in the average spread during the
turmoil. However, we do not ￿nd such an e⁄ect to be statistically signi￿cant. During this pe-
riod, the ECB began a reserve frontloading policy (larger allotment amounts at the ￿rst MRO
of the maintenance period), leading to an excess liquidity situation that was adjusted at the
end of the maintenance period. Liquidity conditions are likely to explain this small decrease.
The results also con￿rm the expectations regarding the calender and end-of-maintenance
period e⁄ects. The EONIA spread tends to increase 2 b.p. in the last business day of the
month, and an additional 4 b.p. in the last business day of the quarter. Volatility also tends to
increase at the end of the month. This result is in accordance with previous studies and relates
mainly to the increase in payments and activities of balance sheet management (Bindseil et
al., 2003, Wurtz, 2003, Moschitz, 2004, Benito et al., 2006 and Linzert and Schmidt, 2008).
The e⁄ect of the maintenance period is captured in the mean at the beginning of the period,
with a 2 b.p. increase, and in the last week of the period with an increase in volatility. This
e⁄ect is not consensual in the literature. Regarding the euro market and for a sample prior
to the one considered here, Perez-Quir￿s and MendizÆbal (2006), Bindseil et al. (2003) and
Wurtz (2003) do not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect, while Moschitz (2004) concludes that the EONIA
volatility increases at the end of the period. Hamilton (1996) and Bartolini (2000) verify that,
for the fed funds rate, the e⁄ect of the maintenance period is relevant for both the mean and
variance.
To a certain extent, the e⁄ect of ￿ne-tuning operations on the EONIA spread corresponds
to what would be expected. The spread tends to increase when there is a liquidity absorbing
￿ne-tuning operation, but liquidity providing ￿ne-tuning operations do not have a signi￿cant
e⁄ect on the spread.
Interest rate expectations for the maintenance period are not signi￿cant in the new oper-
ational framework (which is in line with the results of Linzert and Schmidt, 2008). However,
in the days in which the ECB Governing Council decides to change the o¢ cial interest rates,
the mean spread shows a signi￿cant fall. This is a robust result, but to a certain extend unex-
pected, which may be related to an adjustment by market participants to the new policy rate.
12Regarding the e⁄ects of policy changes, results in the literature are not consensual. While
Wurtz (2003) does not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect on volatility after changes in the o¢ cial interest
rates, Moschitz (2004) concludes that the EONIA volatility increases in the days in which the
ECB Governing Council meets. Both studies refer to similar sample periods.
Expectations on interest rates within the maintenance period are important for the be-
haviour of the EONIA spread. It seems that market participants partly incorporate shorter
expectations over the EONIA spread into the current level of the spread. According to Linz-
ert and Schmidt (2008), the one week ahead expected spread is positively correlated with the
current spread. Although this variable is statistically signi￿cant, this does not completely rule
out the possibility that market participants may be anticipating changes in the o¢ cial interest
rates, given that this variable captures this e⁄ect in the last week of the maintenance period. If
this would be true, then the new operational framework would not have completely isolated the
EONIA from the expectations of policy rate changes. The e⁄ect of expectations on volatility
is not statistically relevant.
It is possible to ￿nd a signi￿cant liquidity e⁄ect in the period under analysis. Given the av-
erage minimum reserve requirements of 172.5 billion euro during the period up to the beginning
of the full allotment policy, the results suggest that a liquidity imbalance of around 1.2 billion
euro would imply a variation in the spread of 1 b.p. in the last week of the maintenance period.
Over the rest of the maintenance period a six times bigger imbalance on aggregate liquidity
would be necessary to observe the same e⁄ect, i.e., a 6.9 billion euro imbalance would be needed
to get a 1 b.p. impact on spread. This result is in accordance with the literature (Friedman
and Kuttner, 2010), although with a slightly smaller impact than the results estimated in other
papers. Wurtz (2003) only ￿nds a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the liquidity conditions of the EONIA
in the last two week days of the period. The results of Ejerskov et al. (2008) imply that an
imbalance of one billion euros implies a variation in the spread of 25 b.p. in the last week of
the period and only 2 b.p. in the remaining part of the period. Moschitz (2004) also ￿nds an
end-of-period e⁄ect, where an imbalance of the same magnitude generates a variation of the
EONIA of 7.7 p.b.
We ￿nd that liquidity conditions are also relevant for the volatility behaviour and that there
is a distinct reaction before and during the turmoil. Until August 2007, excess liquidity in the
last week of the maintenance period contributed to substantially reduce volatility. Given that
during this period, the ECB used to follow a balanced liquidity provision, especially at the
end of the period, this meant that market participants would favor a small liquidity surplus,
probably for precautionary reasons since the costs of non-compliance are elevated. During the
rest of the maintenance period, the e⁄ect was of an opposite sign, but also of much smaller
magnitude. This di⁄erent e⁄ect over the maintenance period disappeared with the start of the
turmoil and the total impact was smaller. During the turmoil, a one billion increase in the
excess liquidity induces a 9 per cent increase in volatility and we do not ￿nd a signi￿cantly
di⁄erent impact at the end of the period. It seems that the higher preference for liquidity led
to a reduced impact on volatility from liquidity imbalances.
The model was also estimated with 5-year iTraxx Europe senior ￿nancial CDS composite
spread as a proxy for the banking sector credit risk. This variable was very stable and close to
zero until the start of the turmoil, therefore any e⁄ect from credit risk would only be expectable
after August 2007. However, we did not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect for this variable, which meant
that, at least in the ￿rst phase of the crisis, the overnight sector remained isolated from credit
risk considerations, both directly and indirectly (via a possible increase in rates due to an
increased demand following a shift in market participants preferences from longer to shorter
maturities).
Relatively to the estimates of the EGARCH parameters, we also found a signi￿cant di⁄er-
ence between the results for the two periods, which con￿rms our suspicions of a relevant change
13Variance equation
Variable Coe¢ cient St. Error z-stat
D6: last week of MP 1:2487 0:1737 7:1902
D7: end of month (2 days) 1:0477 0:2473 4:2368
Rel. ex. liq. last week MP before turmoil 46:6976 6:5131 7:1697
Rel. ex. liq. remaining MP before turmoil ￿173:4230 22:5898 ￿7:6770
Rel. ex. liq. turmoil 16:4369 6:2434 2:6327
￿1 0:4192 0:0504 8:3209
￿1 0:6014 0:0493 12:2089
{1 ￿0:0592 0:0570 ￿1:0387
p1 0:7397 0:1519 11:1007
￿1 6:1273 0:5867 10:4433
￿2 0:7549 0:0721 10:4687
￿2 0:1911 0:0467 4:0926
{2 0:0121 0:0503 0:2398
p2 0:4821 0:1106 8:7195
￿2 5:2724 0:5687 9:2713
Maximum likelihood (log) ￿2334:6967
Source: Authors￿ calculations.
Table 3: Parameter estimates for the variance equation for the period prior to the full allotment
policy (2-normal mixture distribution)
in the overnight market volatility with the start of the turmoil. The variance turned to be more
persistent with the turmoil (￿2 is larger than ￿1), but innovations have less impact (￿1 is larger
that ￿2). The coe¢ cient that captures possible asymmetry e⁄ects ({) is not signi￿cant. The
probability of observing spikes in the innovations is relatively low when compared with previ-
ous studies for the euro area (Moschitz (2004), Perez-Quir￿s and MendizÆbal (2006), Gaspar
et al. (2004)), namely for the period prior to the turmoil. However, the period analysed in
these studies precedes the introduction of the new operational framework, a period in which the
behavior of the EONIA was more volatile throughout the maintenance period. Our estimates
suggest that, before the turmoil, less than one in every four observations are drawn from a
distribution with a larger variance. The variance of this distribution is about six times larger
than that of the distribution with the normalized variance. This indicates that spikes in the
innovations are relatively infrequent but may reach very high levels, which is consistent with
the evolution of the EONIA in this period. With the start of the ￿nancial turmoil, there was
an increase in the frequency of spikes to one in every two observations, but the variance of the
distribution of the extreme values became slightly smaller than before.
5.2 The period of the full allotment policy
As mentioned earlier, in October 2008 the ECB began its FRFA policy, which led to a strong
increase in aggregate excess liquidity in the Eurosystem (Figure 5). This policy had as a
consequence a signi￿cant decrease in the EONIA, putting it close to the deposit facility interest
rate (Figure 1). The EONIA spread since 2004 measured against the MRO rate seems to
behave as a non-stationary series if this period is included. In our analysis given the in-depth
contextual changes, we consider that the beginning of the FRFA constitutes a break in the
series of the spread. Given the policy procedures during this period and the implied high levels
of excess liquidity, we consider that the relevant policy rate became the deposit facility rate
14instead of the MRO rate. During this period there were also changes in the facilities interest
rate corridor whose impact is mitigated by this measure of the spread.
Figure 5: Eurosystem￿ s net recourse to the marginal lending facility (marginal lending minus
deposit facilities) and accumulated excess reserves over the maintenance period (in billion euro).
Figure 6 shows the EONIA spread measured against the minimum bid rate and against the
deposit facility. Now, the spread is strictly positive and we do not observe the sharp drop in
January 21, 2009, coming from the rewidening of the corridor from 100 b.p. back to 200 b.p.
Given the high volatility of the spread during this relatively short period and that our main
interest focuses on liquidity, risk and policy factors, we demean the series using several date
dummies, including end-of-month, end-of-period, some outliers and the period after the ￿rst
1-year LTRO (see Table 5 in the appendix). The demeaned series is presented in ￿gure 6.
Over this period, we ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the behaviour of this market relative to
the previous period, as shocks seem to be more even (not necessarily smaller). Table 4 presents
the estimation results. Unlike in the previous section, we do not ￿nd signi￿cant evidence
of the existence of two regimes and therefore we proceed with estimation of a conventional
EGARCH(1,1) model.
The value of the constant is symmetric to the average spread relative to the MRO rate
(the average demeaned spread is null), which might suggest that out of the factors found to
be signi￿cant, the EONIA would probably be, on average, around the MRO rate. The main
factors a⁄ecting the EONIA spread continue being related to liquidity. As the ECB provides
more aggregate liquidity, the spread tends to decrease. We clearly ￿nd a non-linear e⁄ect from
the excess liquidity captured in the estimated coe¢ cients of the recourse to the deposit facility
in the mean equation. In other words, as the excess liquidity increases, the marginal impact
on the spread tends to vanish. For the period following the settlement of the 1-year LTRO,
the spread is slightly more sensitive to the excess liquidity. The coe¢ cients of the recourse to
the deposit facility suggest that a recourse of 73 billion euro before the 1-year LTRO and of 42
15Figure 6: Di⁄erent ways to measure the EONIA spread during the full allotment policy.
billion euro after it eliminate the positive constant value. From this level on, any impact from
an increase in liquidity is marginally neutral. The recourse to the marginal lending facility is
not signi￿cant to explain the spread, which is in line with what we would expect, given the
high level of aggregate excess liquidity and the very low use of the marginal lending facility.
Until the more stable period following the 1-year LTRO, there continued to exist a signi￿cant
end-of-period e⁄ect and much more signi￿cant than before. From the allotment of the 1-year
LTRO onwards, this variable ceased to be relevant. During this period, there was always
an excess liquidity situation which led the ECB to conduct a liquidity absorbing ￿ne-tuning
operation at the end of every MP, turning the aggregate liquidity conditions in these days more
predictable.
It is also worth noting that the spread was more persistent before the 1-year LTRO set-
tlement. In fact, this operation was quite e⁄ective in containing the evolution of the EONIA
spread, which turned to be mostly explained by liquidity considerations.
Regarding volatility, as already mentioned, we do not ￿nd evidence of the two switching
regimes in variance. It seems that the EONIA spread was less subject to occasional relative
extreme shocks than before the full allotment period. We also ￿nd a signi￿cant change with the
settlement of the 1-year LTRO. The only variables we found relevant to help explain the variance
are dummy calender e⁄ects, namely an end-of-month for the second half of 2009. Contrary to
the previous period, we did not ￿nd any signi￿cant liquidity e⁄ect on the variance. Conditional
variance before the 1-year LTRO seems to be non-stationary and we did not ￿nd any e⁄ect
that may explain this behaviour. Indeed, the conditional variance seems to be explained only
by an increasing trend that was only stopped with the 1-year LTRO (see ￿gure 10). We do not
￿nd statistically signi￿cant asymmetry e⁄ects, but unexpected shocks have a strong impact on
the variance of the EONIA.
The expected spread within the MP was not found signi￿cant for this period, contrary to
the previous period. This may be partially due to the increased uncertainty surrounding the
evolution of the spread. The CDS spread was also tested and was not signi￿cant. Therefore, we
can again a¢ rm that it seems that credit risk considerations did not contaminate the overnight
16Coe¢ cient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
Mean equation
C 52:1316 16:2176 3:2145 0:0013
st￿1 0:8619 0:0216 39:9372 0:0000
￿st￿1 0:3555 0:0799 4:4488 0:0000
Easter 17:6494 1:5660 11:2704 0:0000
ln(DepFac) ￿7:3354 2:7880 ￿2:6311 0:0085
￿ ln(DepFac) ￿8:8916 2:8205 ￿3:1525 0:0016
[ln(DepFac)]
2 0:2393 0:1241 1:9283 0:0538
￿ [ln(DepFac)]
2 0:3752 0:1233 3:0443 0:0023
ln(MLFac) ￿0:0633 0:1448 ￿0:4369 0:6622
￿ ln(MLFac) 0:0566 0:0542 1:0455 0:2958
End-MP 16:8359 2:3518 7:1588 0:0000
￿End-MP ￿0:1929 0:3288 ￿0:5866 0:5575
Variance equation
End month 0:0867 0:9899 0:0875 0:9302
￿End month 2:7965 0:4051 6:9039 0:0000
End-MP 1:7383 1:1729 1:4820 0:1383
￿End-MP ￿0:7378 0:9390 ￿0:7857 0:4320
￿ 1:0106 0:0063 160:9743 0:0000
￿￿ 0:7078 0:1249 5:6673 0:0000
￿ 0:0223 0:0601 0:3707 0:7108
￿￿ 0:9820 0:2431 4:0388 0:0001
{ 11:9456 32:2373 0:3706 0:7110
￿{ 0:0883 0:1576 0:5602 0:5753
Log likelihood ￿683:0458 Akaike info criterion 4:4765
Avg. log likelihood ￿2:1684 Schwarz criterion 4:7386
Number of Coefs. 22 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4:5812
*For the period following the ￿rst 1-year LTRO
The constant refers to the full period during the full allotment policy.
Table 4: Parameter estimates for the period of the full allotment policy (normal distribution)
segment.
6 Conclusions
The ￿nancial markets turmoil, initiated in 2007, brought a high degree of uncertainty and
volatility to the ￿nancial markets, from which the overnight segment did not remain isolated.
Since monetary policy implementation starts in this market segment, it is important to under-
stand how far the ability of the central bank in steering the market according to its objectives
may have changed with the ￿nancial crisis. This study looks to answer this question.
We consider a methodology used in previous studies on the reference overnight interest
rate for monetary policy purposes, either the EONIA for the euro area or the fed funds rate
for the US. The EONIA spread is modelled assuming that the conditional variance obeys two
regimes, following the EGARCH model for the behaviour of the conditional variance proposed
by Nelson (1991) with the particular features of two regimes introduced by Hamilton (1996).
Given the structural changes introduced in 2004 with the new operational framework, we only
17model the EONIA spread since then. For the period since the implementation of the ￿xed rate
full allotment policy by the ECB, we found a conventional EGARCH (1,1) to be more suitable
to explain the behaviour of the EONIA spread.
The results suggest that prior to the ￿nancial markets turmoil the EONIA spread was
quite stable, reacting to calender and end-of-maintenance period e⁄ects and subject to a strong
liquidity e⁄ect in the end of the period. The beginning of the turmoil in August 2007 did
not impact on the mean behaviour. Instead, the EONIA spread became more volatile. We
observe a signi￿cant change in the variance behaviour with the start of the turmoil. Volatility
became much more persistent and subject to more frequent although less extreme shocks.
Moreover, liquidity conditions do not matter signi￿cantly for the variance during the turmoil,
while previously excess liquidity conditions would contribute to an increased volatility in the last
week of the period, but to lower volatility over the remaining weeks. This suggests that market
participants, under "normal" market conditions, did not see the weeks of the maintenance
periods as equivalent, preferring a balanced liquidity situation at the end of the period which
guaranteed a more stable EONIA spread. However, with the turmoil, this e⁄ect disappeared
and we only continued to observe an equivalent liquidity e⁄ect on the level of the EONIA
spread.
The series of the EONIA spread seems to show a break associated with the Lehman Brothers
fallout and the start of the ￿xed rate full allotment policy by the ECB. Given the high excess
aggregate liquidity in the banking system, it seems that the main reference rate for the EONIA
switched from being the MRO policy rate to the deposit facility rate. Therefore, over the
period from October 2008 until December 2009, a "new spread" was assumed as the EONIA
rate relative to the rate of the deposit facility.
The evolution of the mean spread and the variance also shows signi￿cant changes relative
to before the crisis. A liquidity e⁄ect continued to be observed, although much less signi￿cant
than before, which may be due to the increased preference for liquidity that we ￿nd from
anecdotal information and also to a non-linear e⁄ect associated to the existence of an interest
rate corridor. Indeed, we ￿nd a signi￿cant non-linear e⁄ect from excess liquidity. This may
suggested that the ECB full allotment policy contributed signi￿cantly to reduce the upwards
pressure on overnight rates, but had no relevant impact on volatility. Indeed, the variance
of the EONIA seemed to show a sustained increasing trend which was only stopped with the
￿rst 1-year LTRO. More than the ￿xed rate full allotment policy, it seems that it was this
operation that contributed signi￿cantly to stabilize the EONIA and restore the e⁄ect from
monetary policy implementation. Indeed, the lower persistence in both the mean spread and
in the variance suggest this. As a counterpart, the relevant policy rate for this market switched
to the lower level of the interest rate corridor.
Given that market segmentation was one of the likely prevailing features of the behaviour
in the money market during the crisis, it would be interesting to study the impact it may have
had on the EONIA spread. Indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that banks preferred to
get more primary liquidity in regular operations and deposit the excess in the deposit facility
instead of trading in the market. This behaviour would probably make central banks￿task of
steering the overnight rate more di¢ cult.
187 Appendix
Figure 7: Standardized residuals autocorrelation for the model estimated prior to the full
allotment policy.
19Figure 8: Logarithm of the variance of the model estimated for the period prior to the full
allotment policy.




Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 34:3816 1:0496 32:7553 0:000
End-month 5:2008 5:1250 1:0148 0:3111
End-quarter 2:7195 8:3893 0:3242 0:7461
D24-06-09 79:2184 13:4180 5:9039 0:0000
D31-03-09 71:2981 15:0038 4:7520 0:0000
1Y LTRO ￿24:8692 1:5983 ￿15:5595 0:0000
End MP Nov08 6:6184 13:4180 0:4933 0:6222
End MP Dec08 ￿15:2816 13:4180 ￿1:1389 0:2557
End MP Jan09 ￿19:6816 13:4180 ￿1:4668 0:1435
End MP Feb09 ￿5:2816 13:4180 ￿0:3936 0:6942
End MP Mar09 ￿0:8816 13:4180 ￿0:0657 0:9477
End MP Apr09 16:2184 13:4180 1:2087 0:2278
End MP May09 25:7184 13:4180 1:9167 0:0563
End MP Jun09 14:3184 13:4180 1:0671 0:2868
End MP Jul09 13:0876 13:4328 0:9743 0:3307
End MP Aug09 12:7876 13:4328 0:9520 0:3419
End MP Sep09 18:9876 13:4328 1:4135 0:1586
End MP Oct09 22:4876 13:4328 1:6741 0:0952
End MP Nov09 34:4876 13:4328 2:5674 0:0108
End MP Dec09 29:6876 13:4328 2:2101 0:0279
Start MP Nov08 4:4184 13:4180 0:3293 0:7422
Start MP Dec08 0:3184 13:4180 0:0237 0:9811
Start MP Jan09 15:4184 13:4180 1:1491 0:2515
Start MP Feb09 ￿9:8816 13:4180 ￿0:7364 0:4621
Start MP Mar09 0:1184 13:4180 0:0088 0:9930
Start MP Apr09 26:4184 13:4180 1:9689 0:0499
Start MP May09 13:5184 13:4180 1:0075 0:3146
Start MP Jun09 20:3184 13:4180 1:5143 0:1311
Start MP Jul09 1:6876 13:4328 0:1256 0:9001
Start MP Aug09 ￿0:6124 13:4328 ￿0:0456 0:9637
Start MP Sep09 ￿1:3124 13:4328 ￿0:0977 0:9222
Start MP Oct09 2:1876 13:4328 0:1628 0:8707
Start MP Nov09 ￿0:6124 13:4328 ￿0:0456 0:9637
Start MP Dec09 0:5876 13:4328 0:0437 0:9651
R-squared 0:5723 Mean dependent var 25:1682
Adjusted R-squared 0:5226 S.D. dependent var 19:3612
S.E. of regression 13:3769 Akaike info criterion 8:1257
Sum squared resid 50819:3 Schwarz criterion 8:5279
Log likelihood ￿1257:99 Hannan-Quinn criter. 8:2863
F-statistic 11:5172 Durbin-Watson stat 0:1527
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Table 5: OLS estimates for the EONIA spread agains the deposit facility. All variables are one
day dummies, expect 1Y LTRO which is a dummy for the period since the 1-year LTRO was
settled.
21Figure 10: Logarithm of the variance of the model estimated for the period prior to the full
allotment policy.
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